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addition, at counsels' request the Magistrate agreed to listen to the
recordings [of the traffic stop]. On December 14, 2006, the State
filed an additional response to the Motion and Livas responded on
December 18, 2006.
The Magistrate denied the Motion to Suppress on December
27, 2006, in a written decision.
On January 4, 2007, at 4:45 p.m., Livas filed a lengthy
Motion and Memorandum to Reconsider challenging the
Magistrate's evidentiary findings and rulings. On February 2, 2007,
the court clerk scheduled the Motion to Reconsider to be heard
February 16, 2007, less than one month before the six months
would run. At the hearing on February 16, 2006, Livas indicated he
may want to file an interlocutory appeal. After the hearing, the
parties filed additional briefing. Livas filed additional material on
February 23, 2007, twenty-one days before the six months would
run, and the State responded on March 2, 2007, just twelve days
before the six months would run. Furthermore, in his February 23,
2007, brief at the end, Livas wrote as follows:
In the event the Court denies this Motion for
Reconsideration, and does not disturb its Order of
December 27, 2007, denying Mr. Livas' Motion to
Suppress, Mr. Livas requests that the Court stay this
case in the event he determines to appeal the Court's
ruling to the Disfrict Court pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 54.2.
(Emphasis added.)
The Magistrate denied Livas' Motion on April 4, 2007,
twenty-one days after the six month deadline. On May 2, 2007,
pretrial was scheduled for June 22, 2007, and the trial set for July
24, 2007. Livas moved to dismiss for a violation of his statutory
speedy trial rights on May 24, 2007, and the Magistrate denied the
Motion at oral argument on June 22, 2007. Livas entered a
conditional guilty plea and this appeal followed.
(R., pp.95-96.)' (Emphasis in original.)

' For ease of reference, the state has attached as Appendices to this brief: the

ROA, the minutes from all relevant hearings, the transcript from the magistrate's
hearing on the motion to dismiss, and the district court's order on appeal.

ISSUE
Livas states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the District Court erred in affirming the decision of the
Magistrate Court, which held that because Mr. Livas filed a Motion
to Suppress, he effectively applied to postpone his trial, thereby
waiving his right to a speedy trial as provided in Idaho Code 9 193501.
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court, in its appellate capacity, correctly conclude that the
magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law were supported by
substantial evidence and that the magistrate's conclusion - that Livas' statutory
right to a speedy trial was not violated -followed from those findings?

Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a speedy trial
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 ldaho 255, 257,
16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings
of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely
reviews the trial court's application of the law to the facts found.
C.

Id.

The District Court Correctly Concluded The Magistrate Court Properly
Exercised Its Discretion When It Denied Livas' Motion To Dismiss

A misdemeanor case should be dismissed if not tried within six months of
a defendant's not guilty plea, unless "good cause to the contrary is shown" or the
trial was "postponed upon [the defendant's] application."

I.C. § 19-3501(4).

When a defendant who moves to dismiss his case pursuant to I.C. 5 19-3501(4)
shows that trial was not postponed at his request, the burden then shifts to the
state demonstrate good cause for the court to decline to dismiss the case.

State

v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 ldaho 29, 37, 921 P.2d 206, 215 (Ct. App. 1996).
"[Glood cause means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the
level of a legal excuse for the delay.

Because there is not a fixed rule for

determining good cause for delay of a trial, the matter is initially left to the
discretion of the trial court." -,I35

ldaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citations

omitted). The trial court's discretion is not unbridled, however, and its decision is
subject to independent review on appeal.

Id. Ultimately, "whether legal excuse

has been shown is a matter for judicial determination upon the facts and
circumstances of each case."

Clark, 135 ldaho at

260, 16 P.3d at 936. This

correctly found that the magistrate's legal conclusion followed from its factual
findings:
The State did not file the motions, Livas did. Livas raised important
challenges to the admissibility of the evidence and had he won the
motions, most likely the case would have been dismissed. The
Motion to Suppress and Motion for Reconsideration postponed the
trial, not once but twice.
Furthermore, in his Motion for
Reconsideration, Livas actually asked the Magistrate to stay his
criminal case if he should decide to appeal.
By the time all the motions and supporting memoranda had
been filed there were only twelve days before the six months would
have run and the Magistrate's decision itself was not issued until
twenty-one days after the six months had run. The Magistrate
found that the delay was caused Livas' pretrial motions and that the
amount of time the court took to resolve those motions was not
excessive. This Court agrees. The need to resolve legitimate
pretrial motions is "a substantial reason that rises to the level of a
legal excuse for the delay." State v. Clark, 135 Idaho, 255, 260, 16
P.3d 931, 936 (2000).
The analysis of whether there was "good cause" is not
simply a determination of who was responsible for the delay and
how long the case has been pending. Rather, the analysis focuses
upon the reason for the delay and whether there is "a substantial
reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." In
this case the trial was delayed beyond the six-month period
because Livas filed important pretrial motions that may have
resolved the case. By upholding the trial court's ruling that Livas'
motions amounted to an application for postponement or "good
cause" this does not affect a defendant's constitutional right to
challenge the admissibility of evidence as suggested by Livas. It
simply means that if the defendant does move to suppress or files
pretrial motions, he cannot use those to delay trial and then assert
speedy trial as a sword.
(R., p.99.) As noted by the district court, Livas' motions acted as his application
for postponement but also as the reason for the delay. Comparing the Supreme
Court's holding in State v. Young, 136 ldaho 113, 29 P.3d 949 (ZOO?), that the
state's legitimate, good faith attempt at an interlocutor appeal rose to the level of
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State of idaho vs. Gilbert Jr Livas
Judge

Date

Code

User

1/4/2007

MOTN

SR

Motion - & Memo in Support of
Motion for
Reconsideration

Michael Reardon

2/1/2007

NOTC

KM

Notice of Address Change of
Counsel

Michael Reardon

2/2/2007

HRSC

Mi

Event Scheduled - Hearing 02/16/2007

Michael Reardon

211612007

KM

Hearing

Michael Reardon

2/23/2007

SR

Supplemental
Authorities on
Motion for
Reconsideration
State's Response to
Defendant's Motion
for Reconsideration
Jury Trial Set 07/24/2007

Michael Reardon

51112007

JTSC
HRSC

511512007

JTSC

711712007

-

Michael Reardon

-

Event Scheduled Pre-Trial Conference
06/22/2007
Jury Trial Set 07/24/2007

-

Michael Reardon

-

Michael Reardon
Michael Reardon

-

Michael Reardon

Memo in Support

Michael Reardon

Spanish Interpreter

Michael Reardon

CONT

Pre-Trial Conference

Michael Reardon
Michael Reardon

NOTC

Case UnresolvedlStay
on JT for Trial
Notice Of Association Of
Case Resolved

Michael Reardon

MOTN

611 ?I2007
6/22/2007

-

Event Scheduled Pre-Trial Conference 06/22/2007
Motion to Dismiss

HRSC
5/24/2007

-

7/24/2007

-

Michael Reardon

-

Michael Reardon

-

SENT

Event Scheduled - Sentencing Hearing
09114/2007
Sentence Hearing

WHJD

Charge number 1: Withheld Judgment Entered

Michael Reardon

SNPF

Charge number 1: Sentenced to Fine & Costs
$837.50
Charge number 1: Sentenced to Jail 5d I d cr
Consecutive
Charge number 1: Placed on Probation - 12m
Standard Terms
IGHRS ALCOHOL PROGRM
DIL Suspension- Judgment

Michael Reardon

HRSC

SNlC
PROB

Michael Reardon
Michael Reardon

-

-

-

Finger Print Card# Sent to BCI 0100085066

Michael Reardon
Michael Reardon
Michael Reardon
Michael Reardon

Charge number 1: Disposition reported to D.O.T. Michael

7/31/2007

NOTC

- B 1253112
E
Notice - Of Appeal

@&@@4

Michael Reardon

APPENDIX B

CJ3BMIN
CCHUNTAM
SCHEDULED EVENT:
Pre-Trial Conference

ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE MINUTES
JUDGE :
William Harrisfeld

DATE: 10/10/2006 TIME: 14:45
TAPE NO:

CLERK :
A. Hunt

COURT REPORTER:
PR/AGY:
PRO
EZZ&./ATTO

............................................................................
LIVAS GILBERT JR
1 DUI DRIVIN S 18 8004
Case Called Def:
- Advised of Rights

- Guilty
- Bond S

Plea/PV Admit

*

Finish

(

E0612194.(bl

SSN

DO

M

- Present
- Not Pres.
- In Custody
- Waived Rts - PD Appointed - Waived Atty
- N/G
- ROR

)

Plea

- Advise Subaqt Penalty
- Pay/Stay
- Payment

Release Defendant

00012

Agr

APPENDIX C

SCHEDULED EVENT:
Hearinq
DATE:

JUDGE :
W i l l i a m Harriqfgld

uA9/2@06 TIME:

PR/AGY:

TAPE NO:

P. D. /ATTORNEY

.-.

1 DUI DRIVIN S 18 8004

- .C a s e C a l l e d

Def:

A d v i s e d of R i g h t s

- G u i l t y Plea/PV A d m i t
- B o n d S--

.-....

..
..

,

*

present

- Waived

(

Rts

- N/G P l e a

- Not P r e s .
- PD A p p o i n t e d
- Advise Subsqt

- ROR

.

Finish

DOB

SS

=12194.0_?,

M

......

*

BC-,
PROS:

_ _ - - - _ - - - - - - - _ - - - _ - - _ _ - - - - - _ - - - - _ - _ - - - - _ - - _ _ - - - -.

L,IIVAS GILBERT J R

...

..

COURT REPORTER:

L(a:e)O

r.."
- &3 -

CLERK:
A. H u n t .

)

-

-- I n C u s t o d y
Waived A t t y
Penalty

Pay/Stay

.......

-.

Release..[pefendant

P a y m e n t Aqr

.---

...............

0002z
.-

-..--

...,.-......

-

APPENDIX D

SCtiEDULE:D EVENT:
Heal-inu
DRTE:

&Z/.l.C/2QC17

TAF'E NO:

.

TIME:

COURT REF'ORTER:

--

F3R/REY: B

LIIIRS GILBERT J R

i b b g I 3 c a s e Called

Def:

Pr-esent

I

.

,

)

.

-

...

DOA

SS

- Not Fares.

R e l e a s e Defbznd+~rtt
i

.

- I n CI-tstody
- Waived A t t v
Penalty

-----

-----

PROS:

- W a i v e d R t s - F'D R p p o i n t e d
- N/G P l e a
- Rdvise Subsqt

a

Finish

--

ti1

- Q d v i s e d of R i g h t s
- G u i l t y F1lea/PV R d m i t

---- *

CLERK E
t<r-i s t i iMc:C!.krrv

P. D. /RTTDRNEY

-

ML?C12194.=

1 DUi D R I V I I U S 1 5 86104

I

C

@-;r

I, 1 :kji21: 36

JUDGE :
u i a m Har-r-iqfeld

.-

-

:; ,) j, E! ;:';:&g

RDR COUNTY MRGISTRRTE MINUTES

CS3RMil\l

TCMCCLIKM

:

T . / ~ . -I.; . <;.I- +I

00044
: . ., .

....,
.,

'Ci

.;

APPENDIX E

OF THE STATE OF I D A H O ,

I N A N D FOR T H E COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF I D A H O ,
Plaintiff,

)

C a s e No.

M0612194

)
)

MOTION TO DISMISS
HEARING TRANSCRIPT

GILBERT LIVAS,
Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL J . REAR
MAGISTRATE J U D G E
J U N E 22,

2007

APPEARANCES
For t h e S t a t e :

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
By:
Gabriel J. McCarthy, Esq.
2 0 0 West F r o n t S t r e e t ,
B o i s e , I d a h o 83702

For t h e Defendant:

Room 3 1 9 1

HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS, &
HAWLEY, LLP
By:
Michelle R. Points, Esq.
8 8 7 West M a i n S t r e e t , S u i t e 1 0 0 0
Boise,

I d a h o 83702

State of Idaho v. Gilbert Livas
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2
3
4

Boise, Idaho, Friday, June 22,2007
PROCEEDINGS

Page 5
1

THE COURT: This is Case No. M0612194. We are here
5 on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Ms. Points. We had a
6 brief in chamber conference on the motion. We talked
7 about the procedural history of the case.
8
Ms. Points, I'll hear your argument.
9
MS. POINTS: Thank you, Your Honor.
10
As the Court is aware, this motion is brought
11 pursuant to Idaho Code 19-3501, which provides that
1 2 after the entry of a plea, there is six months in which
1 3 to have the case tried, unless good cause is shown. And
1 4 1guess the issue here today is what constitutes good
1 5 cause.
16
In the briefmg, Your Honor, I have outlined a
1 7 few cases where the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of
1 8 Appeals have addressed the issue of what constitutes
19 good cause, and I think those cases are very
2 0 instructive. Those cases are State v. Clark and State
2 1 v. Young.
22
As the Court is likely aware, there is a
2 3 Supreme Court case referred to as the Barker case, and
2 4 that case considered factors in which a defendant could
2 5 argue violation of speedy trial and cases where that's

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The Supreme Court held that that was a legal
excuse, given the fact that in the event it was found
that the evidence should not have been suppressed, and
the defendant was acquitted, he could not then again be
retried. Only that measure gave rise to a legal excuse.
However, back to State v. Clark, witness availability,
court congestion, things of that nature, do not
constitute a legal excuse under the relevant statute.
The statute gives more protection than does the U.S.
Constitution and the State constitution.
The factual record in the case, Your Honor, is
that on September 14th of 2006, Mr. Livas filed a not
guilty plea. That would start the clock of six months
saying the Court should hold the trial by March 14th of
2006.
Quite rapidly, Mr.Livas filed a Motion to
Suppress; and I won't hash out what the nature of that
Motion to Suppress was, but at the pretrial conference,
the same day the Motion to Suppress was filed, October
loth, 2006, and the Court suggested that the court trial
be vacated allowing him enough time to hear the Motion
to Suppress. There was no notice of trial setting at -issued after that time to timely set the court trial.
The Motion to Suppress was heard, and on
December 27th, 2006, the Court entered an order denying

Page 4

Page 6

1 appropriate. The Idaho Supreme Court specifically found
2 that -- there should not be consideration of the Barker
3 factors in a State case, unless there is an illegal
4 excuse established by the State in not bringing a case
5 against the defendant.
6
And I've also briefed in the memorandum, Your
7 Honor, the duty to bring a defendant to trial lies with
8 the State, not the defendant.
9
The two cases that I've briefed, State v.
1 0 Clark and State v. Young, the first was a case that is
11 somewhat similar to ours in which there wassome court
1 2 congestion, some court reasons for the trial not going
1 3 within a six-month period of time, and the prosecution
1 4 also argued that witnesses were not available.
15
That went up to the Supreme Court, and they
1 6 found that that was not a legal excuse. The defendant
1 7 did not waive his speedy trial rights, and that did not
18 constitute a legal excuse under the 19-3501.
19
Again, in the State v. Young, this was a case
2 0 that involved child sexual abuse, and the Court had
2 1 granted a motion to suppress certain evidence that was
2 2 quite telling of what had happened. And the State
2 3 requested that they take an interlocutory appeal on
2 4 that, and the Court granted that, which pushed the case
2 5 back past the six months.

1 the Motion to Suppress. Within a week, we filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, and that was held --that
3 was heard on February 16th, 2007, still within 30 days
4 of the six months. We could have had trial any time
5 between the time the first trial was vacated and March
6 14th of 2007, but there was no notice issued.
7
Mr. Livas along this --during this case, has
8 made every effort to move the case along expeditiously.
9 As I'm sure you can see from the record, we've timely
1 0 filed the Motion to Suppress, the Motion for
11 Reconsideration within a week, and that was heard,
1 2 accordingly to the court schedule. At no time during
1 3 the court trial -- or during these proceedings, did the
1 4 Court or the State inquire whether Mr. Livas intended to
1 5 or wanted to waive his speedy trial rights or his rights
1 6 under 19-3501.
17
Nothing precluded the Court from issuing a
1 8 notice of trial setting from the time first trial
1 9 setting of vacated. In fact, Your Honor, it would have
2 0 been most appropriate to issue a notice of trial setting
2 1 after the first Motion to Suppress was denied. And at
2 2 no time was a trial setting set.
23
Nothing precluded the State from requesting
2 4 that the Court issue a notice of trial setting that the
2 5 matter be set within the time allowed under the statute.
2

1 (Pages 3 to 6)

J u n e 22, 2007

State of Idaho v. Gilbert Livas
Page 13

Page 11

1 this case.
2
In Young, Your Honor, I think that that case

3 does have some similarities, that there was a delay
4 caused at the trial level by sorting out evidentiary
5 issues, and that was good cause. And in that case, that
6 delay was at the State's -- on the State's motion, that
7 the State caused the procedural delay to hear the
8 evidentiary issues and to take the interlocutory appeal.
9 And even at the State's behest, that was good cause.
10
In this case, you have the same kinds of
11 delays, but the defendant's request is even more in
1 2 favor of the State. We fall comfortably on the other
1 3 side of the Young holding. In the Young holding, the
1 4 bottom line is that good cause was found, Your Honor, so
1 5 that case squarely supports the State. No problem to
1 6 citing that case or having the Court look at that case
1 7 atall.
18
Your Honor, the defendant's constitutional
1 9 speedy trial rights are you know, the Barker v window
2 0 for part balancing, I believe is still intact. I mean,
2 1 if we were to have some unreasonable delay for the next
2 2 year because the State had every witness go on vacation
2 3 for every court trial set from here on out, the Court
2 4 would be free to dismiss on constitutional grounds, but,
2 5 Your Honor, the State has not requested a continuance

--

1 procedural right to bring a motion.

2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10

11

12
13

14

15
16
17

18

19

20
21
22
23
24
25

Defined otherwise, it would seem to me would
open the door for defendants in all cases simply to file
motions that had the effect of extending the proceeding
beyond a defendant's speedy trial right, and then
claiming the rights of speedy trial was violated.
And while I appreciate that there are
dishabille issues that needed be resolved, the State did
not ask for a continuance. There was a trial date set
well within the six-month period, and the only reason
that it was reset was because the defendant filed a
Motion to Suppress.
And I agree that had that motion been
resolved, and it was resolved within ample time to reset
the defendant's trial within the six months, but the
Motion to Reconsider was filed -- which necessarily
requires additional time to be heard and to be briefed,
and Judge Harrigfeld provided additional time for that
to be heard and briefed.
I don't think it's unusual or excessive where
the last supplemental authority that was submitted by
the State, I believe, on March 2nd of 2007, followed by
a decision that was issued by Judge Harrigfeld on June
30th -- I don't think that that's an extraordinary delay
for the Court to cause in responding to a supplemental

Page 12

1 once in this case. The delay so far has been because
2 the defendant has wanted to raise these issues. The
3 issues have been heard, and now we're a little bit
4 outside that timeframe.
5
Your Honor, I think that it is pretty safe to
6 say that the facts in this case indicate that legal
7 excuse does exist.
8
Thank you.
9
THE COURT: Thank you. In 19-3501, subsection 4,
1 0 of that statute, the Court, unless good cause is shown,
11 must order the dismissal if a defendant is charged with
1 2 a misdemeanor, is not brought to trial within six months
1 3 from the date he entered a plea of not guilty, and if
1 4 the case has not been postponed upon his application.
1 5 So clearly, Mr.Livas has not been brought to trial
1 6 within six months of the entry of the plea. But
1 7 effectively, the trial has been postponed upon his
1 8 application.
19
He may have -- I'm not sure if it is a
2 0 constitutional right to bring a suppression motion. He
2 1 certainly has a procedural right to bring a suppression
2 2 motion when there's a constitutional violation alleged,
2 3 but I'm not aware of any case law that extends or
2 4 shortens the time -- hamstrings the State, essentially,
2 5 under 19-3501, by the exercise of the defendant's

'
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And of course, by that time -- it is
unrealistic to expect that the trial could have been set
within two weeks after the last supplemental brief was
allowed, I think.
So, I mean, first of all, I'm not sure that
the defense has reached the second prong of the inquiry
that the trial wasn't delayed or postponed upon their
application effectively. And I believe it was. And if
1 were to find otherwise, I think that there is good
cause given the delay and the fact that I haven't heard
anything about prejudice. There has been no
conversation about how this has affected the defendant's
right to receive a fair trial.
And I think for all of those reasons, I don't
think that dismissal is appropriate under these
circumstances. I am going to deny the motion,
Ms. Points.
Do you know where we are in terms of -- are we
going to trial on the 24th of July?
MS. POWTS: No. I anticipate that we will
negotiate with the State.
THE COURT: Okay. So --well, I'm going to leave
it on for trial -MS. POINTS: Okay.

3 ( P a g e s 11 to 14)
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STATE OF IDAHO
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Case No. H0701013
DECISION ON APPEAL

VS.
GILBERT LIVAS
Defendant-Annellant.

This matter is before the Court as an Appeal kom the Magistrate's denial of a
Motion to Suppress, Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss.
The Court heard oral argument on March 27, 2008, and the Court considered the
matter l l l y submitted on March 28,2008.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court a f h s the trial court's denial of the
Motion to Suppress, Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss. The Court
remands for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 9, 2006, at approximately 2:50 a.m., Officer White, Boise Police
Department, stopped Gilbert Livas Jr. for traveling 60 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone. Livas
was driving on Boise's outbound connector heading away from the downtown area. The
Magistrate listened to the recording and found that as Officer White approached Livas'
car, the following exchange took place:'
Officer White: Hello Sir, do you have your driver's license and insurance?
Livas: Yes, I do
Livas: I need to tell you that I am deaf, ok so, I have to read lips, to talk to
you. Here you go.
I

The file contains both a recording of the traffic stop, and a transcript of the recording. Both are attached
to the Affidavit of Michelle R. Points dated October 10, 2006. Livas contested the completeness of the
Banscript and, therefore, for the purpose of the Motion to Suppress, the Magiseate listened to the recording
and did not read the transcript.
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unjustifiably expanding the investigation of the initial traffic stop. The
issue that this court is concentrating on is whether or not the expansion of
the initial traffic stop by asking whether the defendant had anything to
drink that night, and thereafter further investigating the defendant for
driving under the influence, was an unlawful expansion of the initial stop?
There is no issue as to the initial stop of the defendant. The
Officer had probable cause to stop the defendant for violating the law in
exceeding the posted speed limit.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitutes a "seizure" even if the purpose of the stop is
limited and the detention quite.brief. Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 653, (citations omitted). When such a stop is
made for purposes of investigating possible criminal
activity, it must be based upon specific articulable facts
which warrant a suspicion that the person detained has been
or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. (citations
omitted)

State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503,927 P.2d 863. The parties are in agreement .
. . the defendant was legally stopped for violating the posted speed limit.
The Court in Reed goes on and states:
The elements of detention, if reasonably prolonged after the
justification for the detention has dissipated, may become
an unreasonable seizure which is objectionable under the
fourth amendment. Id. at 505.
The Idaho Appellate Court goes on and defines reasonable suspicion as
follows:
The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than
probable cause, but more than speculation or instinct on the
part of the officer. State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664
(Ct.App. 1991) 809 P.2d 522.
The issue this court believes is before it is whether or not the officer had
more than speculation or instinct causing his expansion of the stop. The
issue this Court is focusing on is well laid out in State v. Gutierrez, 137
Idaho 647 (Ct.App. 2002) which states:
The United States Supreme Court has stated that an
investigative .detention "must be temporary and last no
longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."
(citations omitted) Id at 65 1.
The defendant, through extensive briefing and through oral argument, has
not at any time claimed that the officer expanded the time of the stop by
asking the defendant if he had anything to drink that night. The officer
DECISION ON APPEAL
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additional time to be heard and to be briefed, and Judge Hanigfeld
provided additional time for that to be heard and briefed.

I don't think it's unusual or excessive where the last supplemental
authority that was submitted the State, I believe, on March 2nd of 2007,
followed by a decision that was issued by Judge Hanigfeld on June 3oth21 don't thi& that that's an extraordinary delay for the Court to cause in
responding to a supplemental motion.
And of course, by that time - it is unrealistic to expect that the trial
could have been set within two weeks after the last supplemental brief was
allowed, I think.
So, I mean, first of all, I'm not sure that the defense has reached
the second prong of the inquiry that the trial wasn't delayed or postponed
upon their application effectively. And I believe it was. And if I were to
find otherwise, I think that there is good cause given the delay and the fact
that I haven't heard anything about prejudice. There has been no
conversation about how this has affected the defendant's right to receive a
fair trial.
And I think for all of those reasons, I don't think that dismissal is
appropriate under these circumstances. I am going to deny the motion[.]
On July 24, 2007, Livas entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to
appeal. On July 31,2007, Livas appealed regarding the denial of his Motion to Suppress,
Motion to Reconsider, and Motion to Dismiss. On November 14, 2007, Livas filed his
Appellant's Brief. On December 27,2007, the State responded and on January 10, 2008,
Livas replied. The Court heard oral argument March 27,2008.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is being heard as an appellate proceeding. I.R.C.P. 83(b). Review of
the lower court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the
findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of Iaw.

Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486,488-489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1237-1238 (2006) (citing
Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 812 P.2d 253 (1991). A trial court's

findings of fact in a court tried case will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the
judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact. Lindgren v. Martin, 130
Idaho 854, 857, 949 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1997); Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. v.

Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118,794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990).
The Magistrate actually signed the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration on March 30,2007, and
the clerk filed the Order on April 4,2007.

DECISION ON APPEAL
CASE NO. H0701013

Page 5

committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852, 11 P.3d 44,
48 (Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted). Livas concedes the stop was proper. However, he
contends that the officer expanded the scope of the investigation by asking him how
much he had been drinking.
However, an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d
926, 931 (Ct.App. 2004); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361, 17 P.3d 301, 305
(Ct.App. 2000). Where a person is detained, the scope of detention must be carefully
tailored Lo its underlying justification. Id. In this regard, a lawful detention can become
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission
which justified the initial detention. Muehler v. Mina, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005); Illinois v.

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). Brief inquiries not otherwise related to the initial
purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee's rights. Parkinson, 135 Idaho at
362, 17 P.3d at 306 (citing United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993).
If it does not lengthen the stop, an officer may ask questions unrelated to the purpose of
the traffic stop and may perform a dog sniff of a car. Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 363, 17
P.3d 307; see also State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 112 P.3d 848 (Ct. App. 2005).
As stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20-21 (1968), the determination of whether
an investigative'detention is reasonable requires a dual inquiry--(l) "whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception" and (2) "whether it was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Here, Livas does
not contest the basis for the stop. Thus, the Court need address only the second prong of
this inquiry, whether Officer White's questioning was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the traffic stop.
The purpose of the stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated. Parkinson,
135 Idaho at 362,17 P.3d 306. As the Court of Appeals recognized:
[AJny routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious circumstances, which
could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. The
officer's observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop
may--and often do--give rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines of
inquiry and further investigation by an officer.

State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608,613,798 P.2d 453,458 (Ct.App.1990).
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The Ninth Circuit also recently considered an argument similar to that advanced
by Livas - that expanded questioning must be supported by separate reasonable
suspicion. United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077 (9'h Cir. 2007). In that case, the Ninth
Circuit held that, so long as the traffic stop was not prolonged by the questions, expanded
questioning during a traffic stop need not be supported by separate reasonable suspicion.
Therefore, the Court finds that the Magistrate properly denied the Motion to
Suppress and affirms the Magistrate. Likewise, Livas raised no new arguments on
reconsideration and the Court affirms the Magistrate's denial of reconsideration.

B.
The Magistrate properly denied the Motion to Dismiss.
Livas also contends the Magistrate, the Honorable Judge Michael Reardon,
improperly denied his Motion to Dismiss. He argues that the Magistrate improperly
found good cause for his trial being scheduled four months beyond the six month
statutory period. Livas moved to dismiss for a violation of his statutory speedy trial rights
and the Magistrate denied his Motion. Livas does not raise a constitutional challenge to

//

the delay.

/"

The relevant facts are undisputed. On September 14, 2006, Livas pled'.*ot guilty
and demanded his trial be set within the statutory speedy trial period, i.e., prior to March
14, 2007. A jury trial was scheduled for November 6, 2006, well within his speedy trial
rights and a pre-trial conference set for October 10,2006.

On October 10, 2006, Livas moved to suppress all of the evidence. Livas gave
notice that his Motion would be heard November 29, 2006, and his memorandum in
support was 15 pages long.
On November 16, 2006, in chambers with all counsel present, the trial court reset
the trial to begin December 12, 2006, again well within his speedy trial rights. The State
filed its opposition to the Motion on November 20, 2006. On November 29, 2008, the
date originally set forthe evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Suppress, the parties met

in chambers, and the court reset the evidentiary hearing to December 11, 2006, the day
before the scheduled trial.
At the same meeting, the Magistrate vacated the trial. There is no record as to
why the court vacated the trial or why he rescheduled the hearing. However, it is clear
that the trial, originally set for November 6, 2006, and reset to December 12, 2006, would
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the prosecution to demonstrate good cause for the court to decline to dismiss action. LC.

$ 19-3501; State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 921 P.2d 206, pet. for rev. den.
(1996). LC.

5

19-3501(4) provides in relevant part as follows:

The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the
prosecution or indictment to be dismissed . . .

***

[i]f a defendant, charged with a misdemeanor offense, whose trial
(4)
has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial within
six (6) months from the date that the defendant enters a plea of not guilty
with the court.
On September 14,2006, Livas pled not guilty and demanded a speedy trial. Thus,
statutorily, his trial should have been held before March 14, 2007. Therefore, because
Livas' trial was not held within the six month period, the trial court was required to
dismiss Livas' prosecution unless there was "good cause" shown for the delay, or Livas'
actions caused his trial to be postponed. Whether there was an infringement of a
defendant's right to speedy trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v.
Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). The Court defers to the trial court's
findings of fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence; however, the Court
exercises free review of the trial court's conclusions of law. Id.
Under LC.

5

19-3501, criminal defendants are given additional protection beyond

what is required by the United States and Idaho Constitutions. Clark, 135 Idaho at 258,
16 P.3d at 934. Idaho Code Section 19-3501 mandates that, unless the state can
demonstrate "good cause" for a delay greater than six months, the court must dismiss the
case. "[G]ood cause means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a
legal excuse for the delay." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936. "Thus, the ultimate
question of whether legal excuse has been shown is a matter for judicial determination
upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936.
The analysis should not focus on who caused the delay. Rather, the analysis should focus
upon the reason For the delay. Id.

In addition to the

reason for the

delay, the Court may consider the following

factors insofar as they bear on the suficiency or strength of the reason for the delay: (1)
the length of the delay; (2) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and
(3) the prejudice to the defendant. State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8,27 P.3d 417 (Ct. App.
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Livas argues he did not request that the Magistrate postpone the trial; the Magistrate did
so sua sponte after Livas moved to suppress evidence. Livas asserts that the Magistrate's
ruling amounts to the proposition that "if a defendant brings a motion to suppress (or any
pretrial motion for that matter), that defendant effectively waives his right to speedy
trial." Livas argues that opting to exercise one right does not equate to a waiver of
another. While Livas argues that he is being asked improperly to choose between
exercising a constitutional right to move to suppress evidence for an alleged violation of
the Fourth Amendment and exercising his statutory right to speedy trial, that is not true.
The Court finds that Livas' Motion clearly caused the delay in setting his trial.
The State did not file the motions, Livas did. Livas raised important challenges to the
admissibility of the evidence and had he won the motions, most likely the case would
have been dismissed. The Motion to Suppress and Motion for Reconsideration postponed
the trial, not once but twice. Furthennore, in his Motion for Reconsideration, Livas
actually asked the Magistrate to stay his criminal case if he should decide to appeal.
By the time all the motions and supporting memoranda had been filed there were
only twelve days before the six months would have run and the Magistrate's decision
itself was not issued until twenty-one days after the six months had run. The Magistrate
found that the delay was caused by Livas' pretrial motions and that the amount of time
the court took to resolve those motions was not excessive. This Court agrees. The need
to resolve legitimate pretrial motions is "a substantial reason that rises to the level of a
legal excuse for the delay." State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,260, 16 P.3d 93 1,936 (2000).
The analysis of whether there was "good cause" is not simply a determination of
who was responsible for the delay and how long the case has been pending. Rather, the
analysis focuses upon the reason for the delay and whether there is "a substantial reason
that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay."

In this case, the trial was delayed

beyond the six-month period because Livas filed important pretrial motions that may
have resolved the case. By upholding the trial court's ruling that Livas' motions
amounted to an application for postponement or "good cause," this does not affect a
defendant's constitutional right to challenge the admissibility of evidence as suggested by
Livas. It simply means that if the defendant does move to suppress or files pretrial
motions, he cannot use those to delay trial and then assert speedy trial as a sword.
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The Court shares the Magistrate's concern that following Livas' reasoning,
defendants could simply to file motions that had the effect of extending the proceedings
beyond a defendant's statutory speedy trial right, and then claim his speedy trial right was
violated. Surely a defendant cannot be allowed to artificially extend the proceedings
prior to trial and then move for dismissal because the State and the court did not provide
a trial within the required time frame.
Therefore, the Court affirms the Magistrate's Order denying Livas' Motion to
Dismiss on the basis there was good cause for the delay.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court affirms the trial court's denial of the Motions to
Suppress, Reconsider and Dismiss. The Court remands for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 1' day of April 2008.

h e +

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge
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